In a matter of days at the end of February 1917 (dated to the "old-style" Julian calendar), the 304-year-old Romanov dynasty was suddenly and spectacularly overthrown. The February Revolution set in motion a series of fundamental transformations which would shape Russian, European, and wider world history for decades to come. It would also develop its own mythology, key elements of which survive today in standard textbook retellings of the events.
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| Crowds in Petrograd burn the Tsarist royal insignia during the February Revolution. Credit: Karl Karlovitch Bulla (1853 - 1929), Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons |
Myths have their uses in History, in particular to reveal the biases and beliefs of the societies in which they are found. But myth telling (and retelling) itself rarely makes for good History.
This post examines and appraises two enduring myths of the 1917 February Revolution: that it was "spontaneous" and that it was "leaderless". Both have long pasts in different historiographical trends. Both contain a seed of truth. And both are fundamentally misleading as to the actual events of February 1917.
Spontaneous?
The sudden nature of the February Revolution led some observers to attribute a "spontaneous" character to events. In the analysis of William Chamberlin, in his ground-breaking 1935 history of the Russian Revolution, February was "one of the most leaderless, spontaneous, anonymous revolutions of all times".
The apparent pessimism of some socialist leaders might appear to support Chamberlin's claim. Most famously, in January 1917, Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin declared to comrades in Zurich that "We of the older generation may not live to see the decisive battles of this [future] revolution" - a "not-in-my-lifetime" statement which implied that revolution was still some way over the horizon.
In reality, as the historian Michael Melancon forcefully argued in 2000, there are good reasons to reject the idea of February as a "spontaneous" event. Insofar as that word denotes something unplanned, unorganised, and unforeseen, it is clearly inaccurate when set against the historical record.
As archival research indicates, activists on the ground in Russia were considerably more confident than Lenin (an émigré with no first-hand experience of conditions in Russia by early 1917) that revolution was close at hand. As early as November 1916, socialists in the capital city Petrograd had begun coordinating joint action to organise strikes and provide revolutionary leadership. On 4 February 1917, police in the capital reported that "conscious [i.e. politically active and aware] workers are anticipating a revolution in the near future."
Several studies into Russia's provinces have revealed a similar picture in other towns and cities on the eve of revolution. When I researched the February Revolution in the central Siberian city of Krasnoiarsk for my PhD, I found local police reports that likewise indicated heightened socialist activism and cross-party collaboration in the months leading to February 1917, indicating an anticipation of a potentially soon-at-hand revolution.
Remarkably, not only socialists but also liberals were anticipating the end of Tsar Nicholas II's regime (even if not necessarily the end of Tsarism itself). By the end of 1916, a group of disgruntled liberals, critical of the Tsarist mismanagement of Russia's war effort, were gathering to discuss the possibility of a new government. They included Pavel (Paul) Milyukov, Alexander Guchkov, and Mikhail Tereshchenko, all of whom would go on to take key roles in the Provisional Government established following the end of Tsarism as Russia's new official government.
The liberals' plan was not, in fact, for revolution - which they feared would derail the war effort - but for a coup, which they intended to take place in March 1917, replacing the incompetent Nicholas II with his son, Alexey, with Grand Duke Mikhail acting as regent. The actual revolution of February 1917 beat them to it.
Leaderless?
The flaws inherent in the narrative of February 1917 as a "spontaneous" revolution also point towards the limitations of claims it was "leaderless".
While key socialist leaders, including Lenin, Martov, Trotsky, and Stalin, were in emigration or exile and therefore unable to direct events, a great many local activists on the ground were on hand to lead protests and coordinate revolutionary actions. These activists were dubbed the "sub-elite" by historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, author of the most detailed and still standard English-language account of the February Revolution. They may not have been in direct contact with their highest party leaders, but they had the experience of organising strikes, leading protests, and agitating amongst workers needed to direct crowds at the key moment.
Again, in the provinces beyond Petrograd, recent research has revealed a similar picture. And in a provincial context, where news of revolution arrived only after events had begun in Petrograd, the activism of a local "sub-elite" would be crucial. Local activists of different political persuasions (including socialists and liberals) rapidly coordinated their work to lead protests, establish public committees, and form workers' and soldiers' councils (soviets) in order to take power from local Tsarist authorities. The speed at which they acted, indeed, supports the idea that local activists were already expecting revolution before February 1917; when news arrived, they were ready to act.
Making the "Spontaneous", "Leaderless" Revolution: Historiographical Convergences
If so much evidence exists for the February Revolution being neither spontaneous nor leaderless, where did these twin myths come from?
As Michael Melancon puts it, different historiographical trends converged to give "variations on a theme", echoing the idea of a "spontaneous" and "leaderless" revolution for different reasons.
In the USSR, Soviet historians following a strictly Leninist interpretation of the 1917 Revolution found the idea of February as spontaneous and leaderless fitted into a picture which otherwise placed Lenin and his Bolsheviks at the heart of revolutionary developments. With Lenin in emigration and other leading Bolsheviks out of Petrograd in February 1917, the idea of a spontaneous mass uprising was more palatable, at least, than that of a revolution led by relatively unknown local activists of all parties.
In the West, historians hostile to the Soviet historiographical position, especially during the Cold War, embraced the idea of February as a genuinely mass action, out of the control of power-hungry socialist elites. Their analyses often contrasted February 1917 with October, when the Bolsheviks (in their eyes) led a well-directed coup d'état to illegitimately establish their own dictatorial power.
Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1970)
The Revolution to which all revolutionary parties had looked forward took them all by surprise. The collapse of the Romanov autocracy occurred with a catastrophic suddenness which stunned even those who had done most to bring it about.
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (1991)
...the early disorders in Petrograd...were essentially a golodnyi bunt, a hunger strike... the movement broke out spontaneously, without preparation and exclusively on the basis of the [food-]supply crisis.
Ironically, English-language historians with a greater interest in social history, and who were highly critical of reductivist anti-Soviet Cold War scholarship, came to a similar position, at least with regards February 1917. Focusing on the agency of lower-class actors, these historians tended to emphasise the autonomous actions of workers and soldiers, rather than the organisation and leadership of party activists.
Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (1982)
...in the last week of February [1917], bread shortages, strikes, lock-outs, and finally a demonstration in honor of International Women's Day by female workers of the Vyborg District [of Petrograd] brought a crowd on to streets of Petrograd that the authorities could not disperse. ... The autocracy collapsed in the face of demonstrations and the withdrawal of elite support.
Conclusions
Whatever the merits of these positions (there are more in the case of some, less for others), none fully explains the astonishing collapse of Tsarism in February 1917. Without the agency of local revolutionary activists, organising, agitating, and helping to direct the protests, they are incomplete.
So what do we need students to know? Here are four suggestions.
- The February Revolution happened as a result of massive worker (and later soldier) protests, reflecting mass anger at the situation of lower-class actors which was directed against the Tsar and his regime.
- It happened without major revolutionary leaders present, meaning their leadership was not a decisive cause.
- However, local activists were prepared and preparing for revolution in many places since the end of 1916 - February 1917 was not, therefore, truly "spontaneous".
- Those same activists were crucial in leading revolutionary actions, without which Tsar Nicholas II and his dynasty could not have been overthrown - it was not, therefore, "leaderless".
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